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Abstract 
 
This paper develops two new measures of labor tax avoidance based on social contribution 
expenses reported in financial statements and tests them and their determinants within a 
sample of 224 Italian firms defined as legally registered Mafia firms due to having been 
confiscated at some point by judicial authorities, in relation to alleged connections with Italian 
organized crime. Overall, our results reveal that before confiscation legally registered Mafia 
firms engage more in labor tax avoidance than lawful firms do, whereas after confiscation there 
is no significant difference between both types of firm. Furthermore, we find that several factors 
have a significant influence on the probability of engaging in such a practice. 
This study can enhance further research on the effectiveness of our measures and on the 
determinants of labor tax avoidance in other contexts and for other types of firm. Moreover, 
these measures can be added to the other direct and indirect methods commonly employed 
to measure and detect undeclared work representing a primary means of labor tax avoidance. 
Finally, our study allows inferring conclusions on the relation between corporate social 
responsibility and tax avoidance, suggesting that socially irresponsible firms, such as legally 
registered Mafia firms, are more likely to adopt this practice.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Previous studies on tax avoidance (TAV) have concentrated mostly on income tax avoidance 
(ITAV). In this study we focus our attention on labor tax and develop two new measures of 
labor tax avoidance (LTAV) based on social contribution expenses (SOCs) reported in financial 
statements. Subsequently, we test them and their determinants on a sample of 224 Italian 
firms defined as legally registered Mafia firms (LMFs) due to having been confiscated at some 
point by judicial authorities, in relation to alleged connections with Italian organized crime. We 
additionally examine the effect that the confiscation of the firms and their assignment to legal 
administrators may have on LTAV. Hence, we identify two main time periods: the pre-
confiscation period and the post-confiscation period within a time frame of 10 years from 2003 
to 2012 for which financial statements are available on AIDA database. 
Indeed, the Mafias, which are considered to be the most sophisticated form of criminal 
organization, also run businesses in the lawful economic sphere in which they usually invest 
proceeds from illicit trafficking (money laundering). LMFs, according to criminologists’ 
terminology, can be defined as firms that are legally registered and apparently engage in lawful 
activities but are owned by a Mafia family (Champeyrache, 2004). LMFs differ from lawful firms 
(LWFs) in three main ways (Gambetta, 1993; Fantò, 1999): the owners are members of a 
criminal organization; funding partially or totally comes from illegal activities; and criminal 
methods involving violence, intimidation or corruption might be used while doing business. 
Legal and illegal activities are therefore closely intertwined within LMFs as the legal activities 
mostly serve to launder profits stemming from illegal ones (Fantò, 1999).   
On the other hand, labor tax consists of social security contributions and other insurances 
computed on gross wages of all employees that the employers are legally required to withhold 
and pay to tax authorities. However, if employers underreport the real size of their labor force 
or the hours actually worked or the position covered to the social security authorities, they may 
then be able to avoid payment of the legally due social security contributions. In addition, we 
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expect underreporting of labor force and related expenses to be consistently reflected in the 
financial statements. Although the base of calculation of labor tax is different from that of 
income tax, their avoidance has similar negative effects on society by reducing tax revenue 
which is needed to finance public goods and services (Freedman, 2003; Slemrod, 2004; 
Landolf, 2006; Lanis and Richardson, 2012).  Following Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and 
Dyreng et al. (2008) we define TAV broadly as the reduction of firm’s explicit income and labor 
tax liability through specific transactions. We do not distinguish between technically legal TAV 
and illegal evasion as in several cases the legality of a transaction, usually linked to its 
“economic substance” or a “business purpose”, cannot be clearly determined. For example, 
LTAV may be legal if carried out through rearrangement of wages for hired employees with 
other forms of pay or compensation in order to avoid a portion of taxes (e.g. employee discount, 
fringe benefits, income from property leasing) (Feld and Schneider, 2010; Krumplyte and 
Samulevicius, 2010). Although our measures of LTAV can reflect both legal and illegal tax 
reductions we consider that, because of our research design, the illegal tax evasion related to 
the employment of undeclared work (UDW) may be the primary explanation of the results 
conveyed by our measures. Indeed, UDW is the primary illegal means commonly used to avoid 
labor tax payment (Feld and Larsen, 2005; Feld and Schneider 2010). Hence, our measures 
of LTAV can also be categorized as a new direct method to measure UDW based on financial 
statement information.     
Overall, our results reveal that before confiscation LMFs engage more in LTAV by exhibiting 
lower abnormal social contribution expenses (ABSOCs) than LWFs, whereas after confiscation 
there is no significant difference between these two types of firm or this difference significantly 
decreases. These results may indicate a larger resort to UDW of LMFs before confiscation 
which is mitigated after confiscation due to the reinstatement of legality and the consequent 
regularization of all employees carried out by legal administrators. Furthermore, we find that 
before confiscation LMFs which are larger and exhibit abnormally higher material expenses 
are less likely to engage in LTAV, whereas LMFs with higher return on assets and a greater 
proportion of inventory are more likely to engage in such a practice and vice versa. 
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Prior research has focused on the examination of ITAV in varying types of firms in diverse 
contexts. For example, Rego (2003) finds that multinational corporations with more extensive 
foreign operations engage more in ITAV measured by effective tax rates (ETRs) than firms 
with less extensive foreign operations which have fewer opportunities to adopt such a practice. 
More recently, Wilson (2009) and Lisowsky (2010) document similar results in terms of 
likelihood of corporate tax shelter utilization. Other studies find that private companies are 
more tax aggressive than public companies especially in a few selected industries, such as 
banks and insurers (e.g., Cloyd et al., 1996; Beatty and Harris, 1999; Mills and Newberry, 
2001). Moreover, although public family firms are similar to private firms in the concentration 
of ownership of selected individuals, Chen et al. (2010) find that the former are less tax 
aggressive than their non-family counterparts.  
Some traits of LMFs can be identified in some studies on ITAV aforementioned. Nonetheless, 
to the best of our knowledge there are no previous studies in the literature that examine TAV 
in LMFs and more specifically LTAV using financial statement information and the factors that 
may influence its practice at firm level. In this paper we aim to bridge this gap. In addition, our 
study contributes to the business literature given that it adopts new LTAV measures that may 
enhance further research on their effectiveness and on the determinants of LTAV in other 
cultural, legal and institutional contexts and for other types of firm. Moreover, these measures 
can be added to the other direct and indirect methods commonly employed by practitioners 
and researchers for the difficult task of measuring UDW. Most important, their ability to infer 
the presence of UDW can contribute to protecting employees against illegal exploitation and 
to avoiding tax revenue loss and related issues of equity in the social security system. 
Furthermore, these measures can supplement current compliance risk-assessment models 
used by tax authorities. On the other hand, our study examines LMFs that may particularly 
interest the scientific community due to their singularities. Indeed, they are socially 
irresponsible by nature because of their illicit purposes. Moreover, they are private firms with 
incentives, modus operandi and legal financial statement formats (i.e. income statement by 
nature) that differ from those of public listed companies. Finally, it allows inferring conclusions 
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on the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and LTAV, suggesting that 
socially irresponsible firms, such as LMFs, tend to engage more in such a practice.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 introduces LMFs; section 3 reviews 
the literature and develops the hypotheses; section 4 describes the research design and 
sample data; section 5 presents empirical results and their discussion; section 6 includes 
concluding remarks. 
 
2 Legally registered Mafia firms 
 
For the purpose of this study, we define “organized crime” according to the Italian legal 
provision of “associazione a delinquere di tipo mafioso” (article 416-bis of the Italian criminal 
code). In particular, art. 416-bis states that:  
“A mafia-type association consists of three or more individuals and those who belong to it make 
use of the power of intimidation afforded by the associative bond and the state of subjugation 
and criminal silence (omertà) which derives from it to commit crimes, to acquire directly or 
indirectly the management or control of economic activities, concessions, authorizations or 
public contracts and services, either to gain unjust profits or advantages for themselves or for 
others, or to prevent or obstruct the free exercise of the vote, or to procure votes for themselves 
or to others at a time or electoral consultation”. 
Ever since their appearance in the middle of the 19th century, Italian criminal organizations 
have infiltrated the social and economic life of many regions only in Southern Italy. The Sicilian 
Mafia, the most notorious of these organizations, would later expand into other foreign 
countries including the United States. There are several known mafia-like organizations in Italy: 
Cosa Nostra of Sicily and Ndrangheta of Calabria are considered among the biggest cocaine 
smugglers in Europe and, together with Camorra of Naples, began to develop between 1500 
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and 1800. More recently in the 1980s, two new organizations, Stidda and Sacra Corona Unita 
of Apulia, also appeared. 
One of the main reasons for criminal organizations to take on new businesses is so as to be 
able to invest and launder significant financial resources coming from illegal activities, such as 
usury, extortion, drug, waste and arms trafficking and so on. This form of investment of illicit 
capital is a way to break into legal markets in order to obtain high profits and launder so-called 
"dirty" money. Another very important aspect is the need to achieve social consensus through 
activities that ensure employment and income for the population in the areas in which the 
criminal organization exercises control of the territory. 
Several authors in Sociology have analyzed characteristics of LMFs. Fantò (1999) suggests 
that the main trait of LMFs is not the type of business run but the nature of the capital 
accumulation process that led to their formation as well as the strength of intimidation on which 
they are hinged. This force of intimidation, according to the same author, in addition to being 
the precondition that allows LMFs to take a dominant position in a territory, it is also a kind of 
surplus value that is added to what normally yields the legal capital invested in the same area 
and under the same conditions. The mafia-style intimidation is the point of greatest strength, 
the source of the competitive advantages of firms and economies of the Mafias over firms and 
the legal economy. 
Arlacchi (1983) identifies the following competitive advantages of the LMFs over the LWFs: 
discouragement of competition (securing goods and raw materials at favorable prices, as well 
as orders, contracts and commercial outlets using criminal intimidation); wage compression 
(evasion of social security contributions and insurance, non-payment of overtime, denial of 
trade union rights); availability of financial resources (investment of huge proceeds coming 
from illegal activities (money laundering) without bearing the cost of credit).   
In this study a firm is classified as LMF if, at some point during its existence, it has been 
confiscated by Italian authorities because of alleged connections to one of the Italian criminal 
organizations. After the first instance of court confiscation the LMF is entrusted to one or more 
legal administrators. The Legal Administration (LA) is an institution designed to protect and 
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manage confiscated assets and firms and to avoid their progressive impoverishment. The LA 
is based on strong principles of corporate social responsibility and public interest. The main 
objectives of legal administrators are: the reinstatement of legality in the management of the 
firm, the reorganization and turnaround of the firm according to sound management principles. 
However the administration of these firms in not always sufficiently dynamic and market-
oriented and conservatism may prevail. Furthermore, it ought to be noted that the confiscation 
of first instance is a temporary measure that can be followed, even after several years, by the 
definitive confiscation as the last phase of the trial. 
The body in charge of the administration and assignment of assets (including firms) definitively 
confiscated to organized crime is the Italian agency Agenzia Nazionale Beni Sequestrati e 
Confiscati (ANBSC) which was created through Decree Law on February 4th 2010. The main 
concern of ANBSC is to ensure the continuation of firms after confiscation, as most of them 
risk bankruptcy with the consequent loss of employment resulting in a hugely negative impact 
on their workforce and subsequently social stability. According to the most recent available 
data on the ANBSC official website 
(http://www.benisequestraticonfiscati.it) the number of confiscated firms on January 7th 2013 
was 1,708. After confiscation firms can be sold, leased or liquidated and although the efforts 
of ANBSC to ensure the continuation of the business, the most of the firms end up being 
liquidated or going bankrupt as they are unable to face the market competition after losing the 
support of organized crime and banks.     
LMFs are mainly created as limited-liability companies (Società a responsabilità limitata (SRL)) 
with a reduced number of owners that exercise a close control on operations directly or 
indirectly through trusted managers that are often affiliates or surrogates of the same to 
criminal organization. One might then assume that the potential misalignment of interests and 
goals between them is reduced, with no significant agency problems. The minimum required 
starting equity for a SRL is € 10,000. Its capital is divided into shares which can be bought or 
sold just by notarial act. SRLs can issue corporate bonds but are subject to many limitations. 
Organized crime may prefer this corporate structure because the initial investment is lower 
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than alternative legal forms, audit committee is not required, and even from a fiscal point of 
view there are fewer charges. 
 
3 Related research and hypothesis development 
 
There are two lines of research that are highly relevant for this paper. The first consists of 
studies on UDW typical of public economics or labor relations areas and the second consists 
of studies on ITAV mostly concentrated in the business and accounting areas.  
 
3.1 Undeclared work and its measure 
 
The phenomenon of UDW is known under a broad variety of different names. Terms such as 
“cash-in-hand”, “black work”, “informal economy”, “shadow economy”, “underground economy” 
and many others have been used to describe the phenomenon or parts of it. Indeed, there is 
no single comprehension on the concept of UDW in the scientific and applied literature. The 
choice of the research object definition is determined by research objectives and specifics of 
used research methods. The analysis of UDW in the light of tax non-compliance spotlights 
phenomena attributable to tax evasion and avoidance. In this regard, Feld and Larsen (2005) 
defines UDW as income from productive economic activities which are legal and taxable, but 
on which income tax, social security contributions, VAT, etc., are not paid, because they are 
not reported to the tax, social security or customs authorities. These activities are not only 
deliberately concealed from public authorities in order to save taxes, but also to avoid certain 
legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, safety 
standards, etc., and to avoid certain administrative obligations, such as completing statistical 
questionnaires or other administrative forms (Feld and Schneider, 2010). These are the only 
differences between undeclared and declared work. If there are other differences, then it is not 
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defined as UDW. If the goods and/or services are illegal (e.g. drug-trafficking), for example, 
then this is “criminal” activity. If the activity is not remunerated, similarly, it is part of the unpaid 
informal economy (Williams, 2010). Thus, UDW is the part of the shadow economy which only 
involves labor as a production factor and the related evasion of tax and social security 
contributions (Schneider and Enste, 2002).  In addition, the term UDW does not describe a 
uniform type of employment. Indeed, it rather covers a variety of forms of work that constitute 
distinctly different types involving different degrees of social integration, as they are based on 
different motives of employees and strategies of employers or contractors, and their interplay 
(Pfau-Effinger, 2009). Pfau-Effinger (2009) distinguishes three main types of undeclared 
workers form a workers’ motivational perspective. The poverty escape type, in which, from a 
supply side perspective, UDW avoids extreme poverty and provides the main source of 
income. This type is common within populations that are restricted from entering regular 
employment. From a demand side perspective this type of UDW is linked to a cost-saving 
strategy of firms for tasks that require relatively low skills in private households (Pfau-Effinger, 
2009). The second type of UDW is the moonlight type which covers mainly qualified craftsmen 
who are unregistered self-employed. Last but not least, the solidarity-orientated type is UDW 
in which the main motive is the mutual support within social networks, more than the monetary 
gain. With regard to LMFs the first type may be prevalent considering the traditionally high 
unemployment rate of regions in South of Italy where LMFs in our sample are more abundant. 
Recent studies find that UDW is still large and growing relative to declared work in nearly all-
global regions (Schneider, 2008; Schneider and Bajada, 2005; Williams, 2009a; Williams, 
2010). UDW creates considerable costs on several levels: tax authorities receive less revenue 
in the form of income tax or value added taxes; social security institutions do not get 
contributions and undeclared activities partly inhibit the creation of regular employment with 
full social protection. UDW in firms is found mostly in sectors characterized by high work 
intensity but with low levels of organizational rationalization and of production (Pfau-Effinger, 
2009). This is linked to the character of UDW: there is relatively little commitment to the 
employing enterprise, and thus also relatively little enterprise-specific worker qualification and 
10 
 
relatively high worker fluctuation (turnover) levels. These features are not compatible with jobs 
in primary labor market sectors and high-production enterprises that use highly developed 
technologies (Williams and Windebank, 1998). In this regard, LMFs in our sample are 
particularly concentrated in sectors traditionally associated with higher UDW. For the 
development of adequate policy measures which deal with UDW, it is important to have 
sufficient and comparable information not only about the extent, but also about the structure 
of UDW (Schneider and Enste, 2000). Unfortunately, it is very difficult to get accurate 
information about shadow economy activities on the goods and labor market, because all 
individuals engaged in these activities do not wish to be identified (Schneider et al., 2010).  
Nonetheless, previous studies use several direct and indirect methods in order to 
approximately measure UDW. Indirect methods try to determine the size of the hidden 
economy (UDW) by measuring the “traces” it leaves in the official statistics. They are often 
called indicator approaches and use mainly macroeconomic data such as such national 
accounts, electricity consumption, cash transactions, employment figures, etc. (Schneider and 
Enste, 2000; Dell’Anno et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 2010). Such methods can be divided into 
six categories: (1) the discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics; (2) the 
discrepancy between the official and real labor force statistics; (3) the transaction approach; 
(4) the currency demand (or cash deposit ratio) approach; (5) the physical input (e.g. electricity) 
method; and (6) the model approach or MIMIC method.  The model or MIMIC approach 
understands the dimension of the hidden economy to be a “latent variable”, and therefore 
applies statistical modeling, namely structural equation modeling (SEM), commonly employed 
in social research (psychology, sociology, marketing, etc.) to explore unobservable variables 
such as attitudes, personality, beliefs, satisfaction, etc. Using this approach Schneider (2004) 
finds that Greece has the largest shadow economy in Europe, followed by Italy and Spain. 
Dell'Anno et al. (2007) also use the MIMIC method to estimate the size and the evolution of 
the shadow economy in three Mediterranean countries, namely France, Spain and Greece. 
They find that in the French case the shadow economy is declining whereas the submerged 
economy in Spain and Greece is on increase. Moreover, their results confirm that 
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unemployment, the fiscal burden and self-employment are the main causes of the shadow 
economy in these countries, and confirm that an inverse relationship exists between the official 
GDP growth rate and that of the unofficial economy. Finally, applying the same MIMIC method 
to the Spanish case, Alañón and Gómez-Antonio (2005) find a considerable shadow economy, 
measuring between 8 and 18.8% of GDP in the period 1976–2002, and demonstrate that the 
shadow economy is significantly influenced by the tax burden, the degree of regulation and 
unit labor costs. Some indirect methods have been criticized because of the questionable basic 
assumptions and the unreliable macroeconomic estimates on which they rely (Schneider and 
Enste, 2000; Ahumada et al., 2007; Feige and Urban, 2008). 
On the other hand, direct methods to measure UDW are microeconomic approaches based 
on contacts with or observations of persons and/or firms to gather direct information about 
UDW (Dell’Anno et al., 2007). They employ either surveys based on voluntary replies or tax 
auditing and other compliance methods (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Feld and Larsen, 2005; 
Williams, 2006). The main advantage of the direct method of voluntary sample surveys lies in 
the detailed information that can be gained about the structure of the UDW although the results 
depend greatly on the respondents’ willingness to cooperate (Schneider and Enste, 2000). In 
this regard, Williams (2006) analyses the results of a cross-national survey conducted across 
27 EU member states in 2007 involving 26,659 face-to-face interviews. He unravels the 
heterogeneous nature of UDW across the European Union and the marked geographical 
variations in its configuration. Furthermore, he finds that most countries currently use only a 
relatively limited range of the potential policy measures at their disposal to tackle UDW. Using 
information on characteristics of artisan firms in Piedmont (Italy) in 2000 to 2005 and tax 
evasion observed directly from the audit exercise, Di Porto (2011) estimates UDW and finds 
that tax inspections could actually be counterproductive, decreasing both tax compliance and 
tax revenues. Williams (2009b) shows how the formal economy can be permeated by informal 
practice. He reports a 2007 survey in the 27 EU member states finding that some 5 percent of 
all formal employees receive from their formal employer two wages, one declared and the 
other an undeclared and cash-in-hand “envelope” wage. Nevertheless, such a practice is not 
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evenly distributed across all population groups, sectors and geographical areas. The economic 
sector where formal employees most commonly receive undeclared earnings, meanwhile, is 
construction. Construction is exactly the sector in which LMFs in our sample are more 
abundant. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that UDW in Italy is a substantial problem. Every year the Italian 
Statistical Institute (ISTAT) estimates the percentage of Italian undeclared employees, to 
provide an aggregate level of full-time employed (FTE) irregular workers per region and per 
year for the four main productive sectors (industry, constructions, agriculture, and services). 
For most of the years taken in our study, 2003-2009, the percentage of undeclared workers 
estimated by ISTAT is about 12 percent of the total amount FTE in the labor market, of which 
19 percent is in the southern Italian regions (i.e., Calabria, Apulia, Sicily and Campania) where 
most of LMFs in our sample are located.  
 
3.2 Income tax avoidance and hypothesis development 
 
Turning to the other line of research relevant for our paper, previous studies on ITAV can guide 
us to develop our hypotheses since we assume that the motivations and the incentives to 
engage in ITAV are similar to those to engage in LTAV. That said, some previous studies 
support our expectation on the higher probability of LMFs engaging in LTAV than LWFs.  
In this regard, when managers perceive that government enforcement of tax rules is stronger, 
the higher expected probability of detection and potential for imposition of penalties may 
discourage TAV. That is, managers may decrease TAV when they believe tax authorities are 
more likely to detect the avoidance and impose additional taxes plus penalties (Crocker and 
Slemrod, 2005; Desai et al., 2007; Hoopes et al., 2012; Atwood et al., 2012). LMFs benefit 
from a lower level of scrutiny from outsiders since they can count on the protection granted by 
the criminal organization through bribery, intimidation and political infiltrations. Thus, for this 
first reason we expect LMFs to be more likely to engage in LTAV than LWFs. 
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On the other hand, Dyreng et al. (2010) track the movement of 908 CEOs, CFOs, and other 
executives across firms during the period 1992 to 2006 in order to examine whether individual 
executives have an effect on their firms’ ITAV. By examining executives who switch firms, they 
attempt to control for firm fixed effects and identify executive-specific effects. Results indicate 
that individual executives play a significant role in determining the level of ITAV that firms 
undertake, incremental to characteristics of the firm. Moreover, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) 
investigate whether and how individual managers affect corporate behavior and performance. 
They find, among others, that the realizations of all investment, financing, and other 
organizational practices of firms appear to systematically depend on the specific executives in 
charge and some of the managerial differences in corporate practices are systematically 
related to differences in corporate performance. Although the two studies above are based on 
publicly traded U. S. firms, we consider that their results are even more so applicable to LMFs. 
Indeed, in LMFs mafia-member owners exercise a close control on operations directly or 
indirectly through trusted managers that are often affiliates or surrogates of the same criminal 
organization. We then expect a significant influence of mafia-member owners on possible illicit 
practices of their firms including TAV. 
Considering LMFs as firms clearly socially irresponsible, we can also refer to some previous 
studies on the relation between CSR and ITAV in order to get some additional insight for the 
development of our hypotheses. In this regard, based on a sample of 408 publicly listed 
Australian corporations for the 2008/2009 financial year, Lanis and Richardson (2012) find that 
the higher the level of CSR disclosure of a corporation, the lower is the level of aggressive 
ITAV considered as a socially irresponsible and illegitimate activity. Furthermore, Huseynov 
and Klamm (2012) examine the effect of three measures of CSR (corporate governance, 
community and diversity) and tax management fees on ITAV measured by ETRs in firms that 
use auditor-provided tax services. They find that tax fees are associated with lower GAAP ETR 
regardless of a firm's strengths or concerns for corporate governance or diversity, but are 
associated with lower Cash ETR when a firm has corporate governance strengths or diversity 
concerns. However, tax fees are associated with higher GAAP ETR in a firm with a high 
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number of community concerns and with higher Cash ETR in a firm with any community 
concerns. Finally, other studies show how some firms that claim to be socially responsible are 
also engaged in TAV and evasion. Focusing on tax evasions, Preuss (2010, 2012)) finds that 
firms with headquarters in tax havens tend to make stronger claims of social responsibility than 
U.S. headquartered firms, and thus conclude that there is a conflict between claiming social 
responsibility and engaging in off-shore financial centers to reduce their tax liabilities. Similarly, 
Sikka (2010) provides examples to show how companies, including major accountancy firms, 
make promises of responsible conduct, but indulge in TAV and evasion. However, Sikka's 
conclusions are based on case examples, which provide anecdotal evidence, but the analysis 
lacks rigor (Huseynov and Klamm, 2012).  
LMFs benefit from significant competitive advantages (Arlacchi, 1983) and do not need to claim 
to be socially responsible. Indeed, they mostly derive their gains from coercive market 
transactions through intimidation, illegal political connections ensured by their infiltrators in the 
public institutions and privileges granted by illegality and bribery.  
Based on previous considerations our study thus empirically tests the following research 
hypotheses: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, before confiscation LMFs engage more in LTAV than LWFs do. 
 
As already discussed, after confiscation one of the tasks of legal administrators is the 
reinstatement of legality within the firm which may for example include the regularization of 
existing undeclared workers. Hence, the second hypothesis of our study is: 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant difference in level of LTAV between LMFs 
after confiscation and LWFs or this difference, although significant, is significantly 
lower than that between LMFs before confiscation and LWFs . 
 
15 
 
4 Research design 
 
4.1 Labor tax avoidance measures (dependent variables) 
 
The dependent variables of our empirical tests are two new measures of LTAV represented by 
abnormal social contribution expenses (ABSOCs). Importantly, lower ABSOCs suggest higher 
probability of firm engagement in LTAV and vice versa. It is noteworthy that our analysis is 
allowed by legal structure of income statement in Italy that classifies costs by nature rather 
than by function. In order to compute our first measure, we estimate the normal level of SOCs 
(NSOCs) using the model adopted by prior studies (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 
2008; Kim et al., 2012) for calculation of abnormal production costs:  
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Where SOCt is the social contribution expenses in year t that we assume mostly related to 
production; TAt-1 is the total assets in year t-1; St is the net sales in year t; and ∆St is the change 
in net sales from year t-1 to t (St - St-1). The firm subscript is suppressed for simplicity. 
Parameters of Eq. (1) are estimated cross-sectionally for each industry-year with at least 15 
observations in order to control for industry-wide changes under different economic conditions 
(Jeter and Shivakumar, 1999) that affect SOCs while allowing the coefficients to vary across 
time (e.g., Kasznik, 1999; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994). We use all active firms in AIDA 
(excluding LMFs) which are not listed on the stock exchange and with financial statements 
available for 10 years from 2003 to 2012. The total number of these firms at the moment of its 
retrieval from AIDA is 78,340. The level of ABSOCs (ABSOC1) is measured as the estimated 
residual from Eq. (1). 
(1) 
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UDW by reducing personnel expenses has the effect of increasing taxable income and income 
tax burden. LMFs may compensate this through a fraudulent understatement of sale revenues 
in order to reduce income tax as well as value added tax (VAT) payable. Hence, the ability of 
measure ABSOC1 to reflect UDW and LTAV greatly depends on the doubtful reliability of 
reported sales.  
Differently from sales, consumption of raw materials and trading goods is less likely to be 
under-reported for ITAV purposes although it may be over-reported. Indeed, raw material and 
trading goods expenses reduce taxable income and increase VAT receivable. We then 
compute a second measure of ABSOCs (ABSOC2) by replacing in Eq. (1) sales with material 
consumption (CONSUM) computed by adding raw materials and trading goods expenses to 
change in related inventories: 
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ABSOC2 is measured as the estimated residual from Eq. (2).  
Additionally, in order to test the robustness of our results we perform our analysis both on the 
full sample and on the two subsamples including respectively firm-year observations with 
positive and negative values of each of the two measures of LTAV. 
 
4.2 Control variables and base regression model 
 
We explain LTAV measures expressing ABSOCs as depending on firm type (LMF or LWF), 
period (pre-confiscation and post-confiscation) and other control variables mostly used in 
previous research on ITAV. Indeed, we assume that engagement in LTAV is associated with 
 
(2) 
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the opportunities to engage in ITAV given that UDW increases taxable income through 
personnel expenses underreporting as well as reducing SOCs. As already mentioned, we 
assume that lower ABSOCs imply higher probability of engaging in LTAV and vice versa. 
As independent variables strictly related to our hypotheses we use binary variables CRIME1 
taking value of 1 for LMFs before confiscation, CRIME2 taking value of 1 for LMFs after 
confiscation and CRIME3 taking value of 1 for LWFs and excluded as a base variable from the 
final regression model.  
Turning to control variables, previous studies on the association between ITAV and firm size 
(SIZE) produce conflicting results. Zimmerman (1983) finds a negative association between 
ITAV measured by ETRs and SIZE and justifies it under the political cost theory claiming that 
taxes are one part of the higher political costs borne by larger firms. Lower ITAV for larger firms 
is furthermore found by Rego (2003) and Atwood et al. (2012). On the other hand, Stickney 
and McGee (1982), Porcano (1986) and Richardson and Lanis (2007) document a positive 
association between ITAV and SIZE. Interestingly, based on empirical evidence, Gupta and 
Newberry (1997, p. 28) assert that the inconsistent results suggest that firm-size effects could 
be sample-specific and not likely to exist over time in firms with longer histories. Finally, a 
further indication on the likely effect of SIZE on LTAV may come from Perrini et al. (2007) that, 
within a sample of 3,680 Italian firms, find that large firms are more likely than small and 
medium ones to engage in formal CSR strategies also aiming to improve their employee 
conditions. Hence, we measure SIZE as natural logarithm of total assets and given the 
inconsistent evidence from previous research we do not make any prediction on its relation 
with LTAV. 
Previous research finds a positive association between ITAV, proxied by ETRs, and long–term 
leverage (LEVLONG) given that, among other reasons, interest expenditure is tax deductible 
while dividends are not (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Stickney and McGee, 1982; Richardson 
and Lanis, 2007; Dyreng et al. 2008; Lisowsky, 2010; Atwood et al., 2012). Nonetheless, other 
studies document a negative association between ITAV related to tax shelter transactions and 
long-term leverage consistent with the belief of tax shelters being a non-debt tax shield that 
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substitutes for the use of interest tax deductions (Graham and Tucker, 2006; Lisowsky, 2010). 
We include long-term leverage (LEVLONG) in our model and we expect a negative association 
between this variable and ABSOCs since firms in financial distress and possibly bearing high 
interest expenses may engage in an aggressive personnel and related SOCs reduction with 
an associated higher probability of resorting to LTAV. 
Previous studies show that firms with larger capital intensity (CAPINT), measured as the 
proportion of fixed assets both tangible and intangible, engage more in ITAV due to tax 
incentives that permit taxpayers to write-off the cost of depreciable assets over periods shorter 
than their economic lives (Stickney and McGee, 1982; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Richardson 
and Lanis, 2007).  On the other hand, firms with a greater proportion of inventory (INVTA), 
substitute for capital intensity, engage less in ITAV (Stickney and McGee, 1982; Gupta and 
Newberry, 1997; Richardson and Lanis, 2007; Lanis and Richardson, 2012). In contrast, we 
expect ABSOCs to be positively associated with CAPINT and thus negatively with INVTA. 
Indeed, the fact that firms with larger CAPINT usually require less but more qualified labor 
force may discourage the resort to LTAV. In this regard, Pfau-Effinger (2009) finds a higher 
presence of UDW especially in sectors with high work intensity and low technology. 
To the extent that tax incentives (e.g., depreciation), causing book income to differ from taxable 
income, are not proportionately related to book income, ETRs can change simply due to 
changes in book income (Richardson and Lanis, 2007). Hence, we expect ROA (income before 
tax divided by total assets) to be positively associated with LTAV consistent with previous 
studies indicating that more profitable firms, which have the greatest incentive to reduce taxes, 
engage in more ITAV (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Richardson and Lanis, 2007; Atwood et al., 
2012; Wilson, 2009; Rego, 2003). 
An additional control variable used in previous research on ITAV is sales growth (Atwood et 
al., 2012; Badertscher et al., 2010). We replace it with assets growth (GROWTH) that we 
consider more reliable and less likely to be significantly manipulated relative to sales growth in 
LMFs. We expect a positive association between GROWTH and ABSOCs contrasting with 
previous studies finding a positive association between ITAV and growth (Atwood et al., 2012; 
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Chen et al., 2010; Badertscher et al., 2010). Indeed, with regard to ITAV growing firms may 
make more investments in tax-favored assets that generate timing differences in the 
recognition of expenses (Chen et al., 2010). On the other hand, growing firms have available 
significant financial resources that may discourage the reduction of personnel costs through 
LTAV. 
Similar to previous studies on ITAV (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Wilson 2009; Lisowsky 
2010; Atwood et al., 2012) we furthermore examine the relation between LTAV and two specific 
accrual measures such as change in receivables (CH_REC) and change in inventory 
(CH_INV) both deflated by lagged total assets. We expect a positive relation between ABSOCs 
and these accruals given that firms may try to offset lower ABSOCs having an income-
increasing effect with lower inventory and receivables change accruals having an income-
decreasing effect. Previous studies find a positive relation between aggressive ITAV and 
discretionary or unadjusted accruals (Wilson 2009; Frank et al., 2009; Lisowsky 2010; Atwood 
et al., 2012) in public listed companies suggesting that some ITAV is achieved through accruals 
management. Nonetheless, we base our opposed expectation on particularities of firms in our 
study which are private with different incentives from public listed companies.   
Besides accrual management we consider the possibility of a manipulation of real activities 
though transactions affecting the cash flow (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006). In particular, we focus 
on material expenses including both raw materials and trading goods that may be increased 
even fraudulently through fictitious transactions in order to reduce taxable income. Hence, we 
estimate the abnormal level of material expenses (ABMAT) using the model adopted by prior 
studies (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012) for abnormal 
production costs and consisting of the residuals of the following regression: 
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Where MATt are material expenses in year t. Parameters of Eq. (3) are estimated in the same 
way as those of Eq. (1). We expect a negative relation between ABSOCs and ABMAT since 
firms engaging more in LTAV may also over-report material expenses and/or under-report 
sales revenue in order to avoid income tax. This may result in higher ABMAT. 
In order to test our assumption that LTAV and ITAV may be performed simultaneously, we 
additionally include in our model a measure of ITAV expecting a positive association with our 
measures of LTAV. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) list 12 measures of ITAV commonly used in 
the literature including different ETRs measures, the most frequently used (Lanis and 
Richardson, 2012), and book-tax difference measures (Manzon and Plesko, 2002; Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2006). Among the different measures we adopt the current ETR (current tax 
expense divided by pre-tax book income) (Richardson, and Lanis, 2007; Hanlon and Heitzman, 
2010; Lanis and Richardson, 2012). This measure is affected by tax deferral strategies but is 
not affected by changes in the tax accounting accruals (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
Previous studies find that the level of economic development in a country is negatively 
associated with the level of tax evasion and corruption (Treisman, 2000; Tsakumis et al., 2007; 
Richardson, 2008). Furthermore, regional development inequalities in Italy especially between 
North and South of the country may influence the level of salaries, although in Italy collective 
agreements define employee salaries by category at national level rather than at regional level. 
Hence, we include the level of economic development, measured as the natural logarithm of 
regional GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita (LNGDP) of the firm location, as a control 
variable in our base regression model. We expect a positive relation between LNGDP and 
ABSOCs across regions. 
Moreover, similar to previous studies on ITAV (Lisowsky, 2010; Dyreng et al., 2010; Lanis and 
Richardson, 2012) we consider the particular situation of firms bearing losses. Thus, we add 
a control dummy variable LOSS that takes a value of 1 if the firm reports two or more 
consecutive years of negative income including the current and 0 otherwise. On the one hand, 
loss firms may engage more in LTAV in order to improve the profitability even though, on the 
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other hand, the income tax saving coming from losses may reduce the incentive to avoid labor 
tax. Hence, do not make any prediction on the sign of the variable LOSS. 
Industry-sector dummy variables (INDSEC) defined at the two-digit SIC code level are also 
included as control variables in our study, given that it is possible for TAV intensity to fluctuate 
across different industry sectors (e.g. Omer et al., 1993; Derashid and Zhang, 2003; 
Richardson and Lanis, 2007; Lanis and Richardson, 2012). In particular for LTAV, firms in 
sectors with high work intensity and low levels of organizational rationalization and of 
production are expected to resort more to UDW (Pfau-Effinger, 2009). Nonetheless, we do not 
make any specific sign prediction for the INDSEC dummies. 
Finally, year dummy variables (YEAR) are included in our regression model to control for 
differences in ABSOCs that could possibly exist over the sample period. Again, no sign 
predictions are made for the YEAR dummies. 
In summary, to test our hypotheses we estimate the following base regression model for our 
LTAV measures: 
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The variables, whose firm subscript is suppressed for simplicity, are defined in the Appendix. 
 
4.3 Data and sample selection 
 
LMFs sample consists of 224 firms confiscated to organized crime during the 1994 to 2013 
period, some of them provided by ANBSC and others found in online newspapers and AIDA 
(4) 
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database. The financial statements for all firms are obtained from AIDA, the Italian Bureau Van 
Dijk database. It contains comprehensive information on 1 million companies with a turnover 
above € 500,000 in Italy, including the indication for some of them of the confiscation status 
and date of confiscation. Firms provided by ANBSC have all been confiscated by final judgment 
but their small size or their liquidation means that only 54 out of 1663 have financial statements 
available on AIDA in 2013. In addition, we include firms confiscated in first instance and found 
on AIDA database (118) and online newspapers (52) until reaching a total of 224. For the 224 
LMFs we obtain from AIDA available financial statement data for the year of confiscation and 
for the years prior to and following the confiscation within the period of 2003 to 2012. Hence, 
for some LMFs we only have available either financial data prior to confiscation or financial 
data after confiscation. We then estimate our base regression model of Eq. (4) including LMFs 
firm-years and AIDA population of active unlisted firm-years from 2003 to 2012 in LMFs 
industries. We initially avoid the matched sample procedure although in our base regression 
model we control for year, size and two-digit industry SIC code. Table 1 summarizes the 
sample selection procedure that yields the 224 LMFs and the 78,340 LWFs. 
 
(Insert Table 1 approximately here) 
 
Table 2 presents the industry distribution by two-digit SIC groups of LMFs in our sample and 
AIDA population of active unlisted firms with available financial data from 2003 to 2012 in the 
same industries as the LMFs.  
 
(Insert Table 2 approximately here) 
 
Compared to the population of active and unlisted firms on AIDA with available financial data 
from 2003 to 2012, the sample LMFs are especially more abundant in industry groups: building 
construction-general contractors and operative builders (18.30% of LMFs sample versus 
7.00% of population), food stores (7.14% versus 2.22%) and Motor freight transportation and 
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warehousing (8.04% versus 3.69%). On the other hand, there is a lower proportion of LMFs 
mostly in wholesale trade, durable goods (10.27% versus 17.95%), business services (0.89% 
versus 6.38%) and fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation equipment 
(0.89 versus 8.98%). It is noteworthy that Building construction-general contractors and 
operative builders is the sector with the higher percentage (18.30%) of LMFs in our sample. 
This sector presents most of the characteristics of sectors in which previous research finds a 
higher presence of UDW (Pfau-Effinger, 2009) such as high work intensity and low technology. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of LMFs by Italian region where they are legally registered and 
indicates the Mafia organization with major presence in that region based on a recent study of 
Transcrime (2013). Because of their different locations we can reasonably assume that LMFs 
in our sample represent a variety of Mafia organizations, although we do not have the 
information on the Mafia organization each LMF is exactly connected to. Therefore, the 
probability of a selection bias is mostly reduced and a possible concern may only be related to 
the predominance of Cosa Nostra. Indeed, 50.89% of LMFs are located in Sicily where Cosa 
Nostra is largely dominant. Moreover, each confiscation is individually and independently 
carried out by judicial authorities, being LMFs part of the assets belonging to any person 
accused of connections with any Mafia organization. 
 
(Insert Table 3 approximately here) 
 
Some features of our sample selection may affect our results and generate biases limiting the 
generalization to other settings. We just consider LMFs that have been confiscated and with 
available financial data on AIDA. This database only includes companies with a turnover above 
€ 500,000. For some firms confiscation year is not available and we find it out through a Google 
search for articles in local online newspapers including details on confiscation and whose 
correctness is reasonable but cannot be corroborated. Several preventive confiscations may 
have been carried out for the same firm and subsequently cancelled by the court. Criminal 
connection is in these cases uncertain. 
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Finally, Table 4 includes number of LMFs by confiscation year. It can be seen that 2012 is the 
year with largest number of confiscated LMFs and more than 50% of LMFs have been 
confiscated from 2010 to 2013. 
 
(Insert Table 4 approximately here) 
 
5 Results and discussions 
5.1 Estimation of normal social contribution expenses 
 
Tables 5 and 6 respectively report the estimation results by two-digit SIC code of Eq. (1) and 
Eq. (2) used to determine NSOCs. Results are presented following the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) procedure. More specifically, the reported coefficients and R2 are mean values by two-
digit SIC code of cross-sectional estimations across 280 industry-years. Significance levels of 
coefficients are calculated using the standard errors of the coefficients across industry-years.  
 
(Insert Table 5 approximately here) 
(Insert Table 6 approximately here) 
 
Initially, it should be noted that all the estimated regressions are significant at the 0.01 level 
according to the F tests, except for the singular case of SIC code 45 (Transportation by air) in 
Eq. (2) estimations. Significance of coefficients, their sign and R2 vary across the various two-
digit SIC codes although in different degrees. Hence, the industry sector is a relevant aspect 
to consider in the interpretation of LTAV measures calculated based on the residuals of the 
estimations. Overall, the average R2 across the 280 industry-years is 0.29 for Eq. (1) and 0.19 
for Eq. (2). For comparison, previous studies aiming to detect accrual-based earnings 
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management through abnormal accruals find values of R2 even below 0.19 in regressions 
estimating normal accruals (Dechow et al., 2010). 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
 
Table 7 and Figure 1 present median ABSOC1 and ABSOC2 for LMFs and for years -5 to +2 
relative to the year 0 of confiscation. We report medians because they are less likely than 
means to be influenced by extreme observations. We find significantly negative ABSOC1 and 
ABSOC2 in all the years except in year +2 for ABSOC1. These results provide a first indication 
of LTAV which before confiscation and according to both measures does not exhibit a clear 
trend. Hence, we infer that LMFs before confiscation may engage in LTAV consistently so as 
not to show significant fluctuations to the authorities and raise any red flags. On the other hand, 
after confiscation and in particular in years 0 and 1 LTAV sharply decreases (ABSOC1 and 
ABSOC2 increase) as a consequence of the intervention of legal administrators. In 
confirmation of this, an untabulated two-tailed Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test indicates that 
median ABSOC1 and ABSOC2 for LMFs are significantly (p<0.01) higher after confiscation (-
0.0052 and -0.0105, respectively) relative to before confiscation (-0.0117 and -0.0161, 
respectively). Finally, it is worth noting that ABSOC1 shows higher percentage variations than 
ABSOC2 in years -1, 0 and 1 most likely due to the higher fluctuations of net sales compared 
to material consumption around confiscation. 
 
  (Insert Table 7 approximately here) 
(Insert Figure 1 approximately here) 
 
The following Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for each variable considered in our base 
regression model comparing the LMFs firm-years before and after confiscation to the LWFs 
firm-years. Again, we report medians because they are less likely than means to be influenced 
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by extreme observations. All continuous variables, except LNGDP, are winsorized at the top 
and bottom 1 percent of their distributions to avoid the influence of outliers. 
 
(Insert Table 8 approximately here) 
 
Medians of our variables of interest ABSOC1 and ABSOC2 are both negative and significantly 
(p<0.01) lower for LMFs before confiscation relative to LWFs, providing a first indication in 
support of our hypothesis H1 on the higher LTAV in LMFs. Consistently, the same results are 
found for variables N_ABSOC1 and N_ABSOC2, whereas there is no significant difference at 
conventional levels in variables P_ABSOC1 and P_ABSOC2.  
On the other hand, consistent with our hypothesis H2 there is no significant difference at 
conventional levels in variable ABSOC1 between LMFs after confiscation and LWFs, whereas 
variable ABSOC2 remains significantly (p<0.01) lower for LMFs even though the difference in 
medians decreases from -0.0094 to -0.0038. In addition, in LMFs unsigned values of variables 
P_ABSOC1 and N_ABSOC1 becomes significantly (p<0.05) lower than those of LWFs 
confirming the change of behavior relative to before confiscation as a consequence of the 
actions of legal administrators. In contrast, no significant difference at conventional levels is 
found in variables P_ABSOC2 and N_ABSOC2 between both types of firm. It is noteworthy 
that in LMFs before confiscation N_ABSOC1 observations represent 72.08% of total ABSOC1 
observations and N_ABSOC2 observations represent 75.16% of total ABSOC2 observations. 
Furthermore, after confiscation the percentage decreases to 62.86% for N_ABSOC1 and to 
67.35% for N_ABSOC2. Overall, these percentages provide further evidence in support of our 
hypotheses H1 and H2. 
As regards the rest of variables, before confiscation variable LEVLONG is not significantly 
different at conventional levels between the two types of firm. However, after confiscation LMFs 
appear significantly (p<0.01) more long term indebted than LWFs because of the likely loss of 
the criminal organization financial support. A consequent LMFs wider resort to bank financing 
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may additionally explain the significant increase in their long term indebtedness after 
confiscation.  
Furthermore, LMFs are significantly (p<0.01) less profitable (ROA) than LWFs both before and 
after confiscation. An overinvestment of financial resources stemming from illegal activities 
(money laundering) and a downward earnings manipulation for ITAV purposes may explain 
this lower profitability of LMFs before confiscation. On the other hand, after confiscation the 
explanation may lie in the loss of business opportunities and competitive advantages (Arlacchi, 
1983; Fantò, 1999) and in the cost of the reinstatement of legality including the regularization 
of UDW. A further consistent indication is the significantly (p<0.01) higher total assets growth 
rate (GROWTH) of LMFs before confiscation relative to LWFs, presumably financed with dirty 
money, which becomes significantly (p<0.01) lower after confiscation because of the likely 
suspension of any money laundering activity. Moreover, significantly (p<0.01) higher variables 
CH_REC and CH_INV for LMFs before confiscation relative to LWFs may suggest a wider 
engagement in accrual-based earnings management of the former firms. A higher real 
activities manipulation of LMFs through material expenses can also be inferred by significantly 
(p<0.01) higher variable ABMAT both before and after confiscation. Variable LNGDP is  
significantly (p<0.01) lower for LMFs relative to LWFs given that LMFs in our sample are mostly 
concentrated in southern Italian regions with a traditional lower economic development. 
Interestingly, significantly (p<0.01) lower variable ETR for LMFs both before and after 
confiscation provides evidence of a higher ITAV in these firms. This result supports our 
assumption on LTAV and ITAV being performed in parallel because of the similar underlying 
motivations and incentives. It is noteworthy that the percentage of firms with two or more 
consecutive years of negative income (%LOSS) is significantly (p<0.01) lower for LMFs before 
confiscation relative to LWFs. Nonetheless, after confiscation the situation is completely 
reversed consistently with the average decline of economic performance of LMFs.  
Finally, an untabulated analysis shows that correlations among independent variables of our 
base regression model in Eq. (4) are low (below 0.43), thus providing a first indication that 
collinearity is unlikely to affect estimations. 
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5.3 Base regression results 
 
We estimate our model in Eq. (4) through a linear regression with panel-corrected standard 
errors in order to consider heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across panels. 
Table 9 presents the results for our LTAV measures. 
 
(Insert Table 9 approximately here) 
 
Initially, it is noteworthy that all the estimated regressions are significant at the 0.01 level 
according to the chi-square tests. On the other hand, consistent with our hypothesis H1 
coefficient on variable CRIME1 is negative and significant at the 0.01 level in ABSOC1, 
ABSOC2, N_ABSOC1 and N_ABSOC2  regressions whereas in P_ABSOC1 and P_ABSOC2 
regressions it is not significant a conventional levels. Overall, these results suggest that before 
confiscations LMFs engage more in LTAV than LWFs do. Indeed, the consistent results 
showed by both variables ABSOC1 and ABSOC2 in support of our hypothesis H1 provide the 
first insight into the ability of these measures to correctly reflect LTAV in the examined firms. 
In particular, computation of ABSOC1 is based on reported sales whereas computation of 
ABSOC2 is based on reported material consumption. Hence, the consistency of the results 
between both measures provides evidence of robustness in front of possible manipulations 
that may affect both material consumption and sales reported figures. 
In addition, coefficient on CRIME2 is not significant at conventional levels both in ABSOC1 
and in ABSOC2 regression providing support for our hypothesis H2. In contrast, in N_ABSOC2 
regression coefficient on CRIME2 is negative and significant (p<0.01) and in N_ABSOC1 
regression it is negative and only marginally significant (p<0.10). However, an untabulated test 
shows that in both regressions it is significantly (p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively) higher and 
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then closer to zero than coefficient on CRIME1. This suggests that the difference in level of 
LTAV significantly decreases after confiscation consistent with hypothesis H2. Finally, in 
P_ABSOC1 and P_ABSOC2 regressions coefficient on CRIME2 is positive and significant 
(p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively). Overall, these results provide further evidence on the ability 
of our measures to actually reflect LTAV given that an action commonly taken by legal 
administrators after confiscation is the regularization of UDW which causes an increase in 
SOCs. 
As regards the other variables, coefficient on SIZE is negative and significant (p<0.01) in 
ABSOC1, P_ABSOC1, ABSOC2 and P_ABSOC2 regressions, whereas it is positive and 
significant (p<0.01) in N_ABSOC1 and N_ABSOC2 regressions. These results indicate that 
within the subsample with negative ABSOCs smaller firms are more likely to engage in LTAV 
in contrast to the opposed indication that can be inferred from the results on the full sample. 
The coefficients on the rest of variables are significant (p<0.01) and have the expected sign 
with some exceptions. For example, coefficient on INVTA is significant (p<0.01) and negative, 
as expected, in ABSOC2, P_ABSOC1 and P_ABSOC2 regressions, whereas in ABSOC1, 
N_ABSOC1 and N_ABSOC2 regressions it is positive. Some conflicting results are also found 
for coefficient on CAPINT which is positive and significant (p<0.01), as expected, in ABSOC1, 
N_ABSOC1 and N_ABSOC2 regressions whereas it is negative and significant in ABSOC2, 
P_ABSOC1 and P_ABSOC2 regressions. Finally, coefficient on LOSS is significant (p<0.01) 
and positive in all regressions except in N_ABSOC2 regression. 
In summary, the multiple regression analysis provides evidence that, consistent with 
hypothesis H1, before confiscation LMFs engage more in LTAV than LWFs do by exhibiting 
lower ABSOCs. Furthermore, consistent with hypothesis H2, there is no significant difference 
in level of ABSOCs and thus in LTAV between LMFs after confiscation and LWFs or this 
difference significantly decreases relative to before confiscation.  
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5.4 Additional analyses 
 
5.4.1 Regression analysis with interactions 
 
In order to empirically determine the effect of each control variable on LTAV in LMFs before 
confiscation we estimate additional regressions including the interactions of control variables 
with the binary variable CRIME1. Interestingly, there are mainly four variables that have a 
significant effect on LTAV in LMFs before confiscation. Specifically, coefficients on the 
interaction variables SIZE*CRIME1 and ABMAT*CRIME1 are positive and significant (p<0.05) 
indicating respectively that larger LMFs and with higher abnormal material expenses are less 
likely to engage in LTAV and vice versa. On the other hand, coefficients on interaction variables 
ROA*CRIME1 and INVTA*CRIME1 are negative and significant (p<0.05) suggesting 
respectively that LMFs with higher profitability and a greater proportion of inventory are more 
likely to engage in LTAV and vice versa. 
 
5.4.2 Alternative model using unadjusted social contribution expenses 
 
We estimate an alternative regression model by replacing in Eq. (4) dependent variables on 
ABSOCs with the unadjusted SOCs variable SOCt/TAt-1 as well as adding the independent 
variables of Eq. (1). We omit variable SIZE whose effect is already reflected by highly 
correlated variable 1/TAt-1 (r=-0.76, p<0.01). Our purpose is to assess whether our results are 
confirmed through a more direct measure of paid SOCs such as SOCt/TAt-1 which can be 
considered a low cost alternative to ABSOCs in terms of calculation efforts. Table 10 shows 
the results of our estimation. Because the residuals can be correlated across firm and/or over 
time, test statistics and reported significance levels are based on the standard errors adjusted 
by a two dimensional cluster at the firm and year levels (Gow et al., 2010; Colin et al., 2011). 
 
(Insert Table 10 approximately here) 
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The unadjusted SOCs regression is significant at the 0.01 level according to the chi-square 
test. Its results mostly confirm previous findings based on ABSOCs regressions. Indeed, 
coefficient on variable CRIME1 is negative and significant (p<0.05), supporting hypothesis H1, 
and coefficient on variable CRIME2 is not significant at conventional levels, supporting 
hypothesis H2. Furthermore, the magnitude of coefficient on CRIME1 (-0.0061) represents 
about 12% of the average SOCt/TAt-1 (0.0508) for the full population of LWFs, providing a rough 
indication of the intensity of LTAV.  
As regards the rest of control variables, results are similar to those of Eq. (1) and Eq. (4) in 
terms of sign and significance of variables. 
In summary, the usage of unadjusted SOCs provides additional support to our results by 
spotting a different SOCs payment pattern between LMFs and LWFs as well as confirming 
significant associations with other variables that may influence LTAV. Nonetheless, the related 
variable SOCt/TAt-1, individually considered, says little about the LTAV pattern of a firm. Indeed, 
a basis for comparison and assessment is not immediately available as the official tax rate can 
be for those studies that try to measure ITAV through ETRs. Additionally, differences in 
industry sectors and annual economic conditions are not reflected in unadjusted SOCs. On the 
other hand, ABSOCs are calculated as the residuals of cross-sectional regressions for each 
industry-year and their sign (positive or negative) provides a first immediate indication of the 
likelihood of a firm engaging in LTAV practices. 
 
5.4.3 Matching procedure 
 
We perform a further robustness test of our results by estimating our base regression model 
within a matched sample. So as to define a control sample, researchers choose from a wide 
range of firm characteristics on which to match such as: cash flows, year, industry, net income, 
size proxied by sales or total assets, ROA, etc. (Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Perry and 
Williams, 1994; Defond and Subramanyam, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998; Kothari et al., 2005). We 
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match each LMF with three LWFs on year, industry, sign of profitability (ROA) and asset 
quintile. Indeed, we believe that matching on actual profitability or actual assets is problematic 
(e.g., by using propensity scores) because the profitability or assets of LMFs are likely to be 
far more manipulated and unreliable than those of LWFs. Hence, using something more 
generic, like sign of profitability or an asset group considers that there might be some marginal 
manipulation of income or assets by LMFs, but that the manipulation is not so massive as to 
cause a LMF to report a profit instead of a loss, or jump into another asset quintile. Matching 
is performed for both LMFs pre-confiscation firm-year observations and for LMFs post-
confiscation firm-year observations. We add to the dummy variables CRIME1 and CRIME2 the 
new dummy variables LAW1 and LAW2. LAW1 takes value of 1 for LWFs observations 
matched to LMFs pre-confiscation firm-years and 0 otherwise, whereas LAW2 takes value of 
1 for LWFs observations matched to LMFs post-confiscation firm-years. For each LTAV 
measure we estimate two regressions excluding as base dummy variable LAW1 or LAW2, 
alternatively. However, we present a result column for each dependent variable and only report 
values for variables CRIME1 (versus base LAW1) and CRIME2 (versus base LAW2).  Indeed, 
switching base from LAW1 to LAW2 does not affect value and significance of the other 
independent variables except for the intercept whose values and significances are separately 
reported for each base. Table 11 shows the results of our estimations. 
 
 
(Insert Table 11 approximately here) 
 
 
Again, all the estimated regressions are significant at the 0.01 level according to the chi-square 
tests. Results of matched sample estimations are mostly consistent with those of the 
unmatched sample. Indeed, both in ABSOC1 and ABSOC2 regressions coefficient on variable 
CRIME1 is negative and significant (p<0.01), providing further support for hypothesis H1, and 
coefficient on variable CRIME2 is not significant at conventional levels, providing further 
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support for hypothesis H2. As regards the rest of control variables, results are similar to those 
of the unmatched sample estimations in terms of sign and significance of variables. 
In summary, the documented robustness of our results to different estimation methods can 
relieve concerns that our findings are driven by uncontrolled factors. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this study we analyze LTAV and its determinants within a sample of 224 Italian firms, defined 
as LMFs due to having been confiscated at some point by Italian judicial authorities, in relation 
to alleged connections with Italian organized crime. We build two new measures of LTAV 
based on SOCs reported by firms in their financial statements. Overall, our results reveal that 
before confiscation LMFs engage more in LTAV than LWFs do as suggested by their lower 
ABSOCs. After confiscation, following the reinstatement of legality performed by legal 
administrators, there is no significant difference in level of LTAV between both types of firm or 
this difference significantly decreases as indicated by results on difference in ABSOCs. 
Moreover, a further analysis shows that before confiscation LMFs which are larger and exhibit 
abnormally higher material expenses are less likely to engage in LTAV, whereas LMFs with 
higher return on assets and with a greater proportion of inventory are more likely to engage in 
such a practice and vice versa. Our results are robust to a variety of estimation methodologies. 
Our study contributes to the academic literature in several ways. First of all, it is the first to 
examine LTAV based on financial statement information and the factors that may influence its 
practice at firm level. In particular, it adopts two new LTAV measures that may enhance further 
research on its effectiveness in other contexts and for other types of firm. Moreover, these 
measures can be added to the other direct and indirect methods commonly employed to 
measure UDW. More importantly, their ability to infer the presence of UDW can contribute to 
protecting employees against illegal exploitation and to avoiding tax revenue loss and related 
issues of equity in the social security system. Furthermore, these measures can supplement 
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current compliance risk-assessment models used by tax authorities. On the other hand, our 
study examines LMFs that may particularly interest the scientific community due to their 
singularities. Indeed, they are socially irresponsible by nature and are private firms with 
incentives, modus operandi and legal financial statement formats that differ from those of 
public listed companies. Finally, our research allows inferring conclusions on the relation 
between CSR and LTAV, suggesting that socially irresponsible firms, such as LMFs, tend to 
engage more in such a practice.  
These findings, however, are subject to several limitations. We cannot reject the possibility of 
a bias in the selection of our sample of LMFs considering that undetected LMFs are 
unobservable and smaller LMFs, unavailable on AIDA, are excluded. Furthermore, there could 
be selection biases in LMFs pursued and confiscated by Italian authorities. Our measures of 
LTAV, based on ABSOCs, greatly depend on the reliability of reported sales revenue and 
material consumption figures. The likely manipulation of these figures and the consequent 
endogenity in the calculation models may affect the correct interpretation of our measures, 
although the consistent results of estimations within a matched sample may partially relieve 
this concern. 
We propose several opportunities for future research. Our measures could be applied to other 
types of firm that are expected to engage in LTAV in order to gain further insight into their 
measurement ability. Furthermore, alternative models could be tested in order to improve the 
predictive power of normal SOCs regressions and produce more accurate LTAV measures. 
Finally, this study could be replicated in other countries, where organized crime is deeply 
rooted or UDW is a widespread practice, in order to determine whether its results are confirmed 
in a different cultural, legal and institutional context. 
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7 Appendix  
7.1 Definition of variables of the base regression model (Eq. (4)): 
 
LTAV_PROXY = ABSOC1, P_ ABSOC1, N_ ABSOC1, ABSOC2, P_ ABSOC2 or N_ 
ABSOC2: 
ABSOC1 = Abnormal SOCs equal to estimated residual from Eq. (1) 
P_ ABSOC1 = Positive ABSOC1 
N_ ABSOC1 = Negative ABSOC1 
ABSOC2 = Abnormal SOCs equal to estimated residual from Eq. (2) 
P_ ABSOC2 = Positive ABSOC2 
N_ ABSOC2 = Negative ABSOC2 
CRIME1 = Dummy variable taking value of 1 for LMFs before confiscation and 0 otherwise 
CRIME2 = Dummy variable taking value of 1 for LMFs after confiscation and 0 otherwise 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets in thousands 
LEVLONG = Long-term debts divided by total assets 
CAPINT = Net property, plant and equipment and net intangible fixed assets divided by total 
assets 
INVTA = Inventory divided by total assets 
ROA = Income before tax divided by total assets 
GROWTH = (Total assets − lagged total assets)/ lagged total assets 
CH_REC = (Receivables - lagged receivables)/ lagged total assets 
CH_INV = (Inventory - lagged inventory)/lagged total assets 
ABMAT = Abnormal material expenses equal to residuals from Eq. (3) 
LNGDP = Natural logarithm of regional GDP per capita (source ISTAT) 
LOSS = Dummy variable that that takes a value of 1 if the firm had two or more consecutive 
years of negative income including the current and 0 otherwise 
ETR = Current tax expense divided by income before tax 
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INDSEC = Dummy variables representing industry defined by the two-digit SIC code 
YEAR = Dummy variables representing the fiscal year 
 
7.2 List of abbreviations: 
 
ABSOCs: abnormal social contribution expenses 
ANBSC: Agenzia Nazionale Beni Sequestrati e Confiscati 
CFO: cash flow from operations 
CSR: corporate social responsibility 
ETR: effective tax rate 
FTE: full-time employed 
ISTAT: Italian Statistical Institute 
ITAV: income tax avoidance 
LA: legal administration 
LMF: legally registered Mafia firm 
LTAV: labor tax avoidance 
LWF: lawful firm 
NSOCs: normal social contribution expenses 
SRL: Società a responsabilità limitata 
SOCs: social contribution expenses 
TAV: tax avoidance 
UDW: undeclared work 
VAT: value added tax 
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Table 1: Sample selection  
 Number of firms 
LMFs sample 
 
LMFs definitively confiscated at November 5th 2012 provided by 
ANBSC 
1,663 
Less: LMFs provided by ANBSC with data unavailable on AIDA 
database 
-1,609 
Add: LMFs found on AIDA database with status confiscated 118 
Add: confiscated LMFs found in online newspapers with data available 
in AIDA 
52 
Final LMFs sample 224 
LMFs year observations in base regression model (ABSOC1) 1,046 
 
 
LWFs control sample 
 
Aida population of active and unlisted firms with available financial data 
from 2003 to 2012 in the same two-digit SIC industries as LMFs 
78,340 
LWFs year observations in base regression model (ABSOC1) 587,555 
 
Source: ANBSC and AIDA database, 2013. 
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Table 2: Industry distribution of LMFs and AIDA population of active unlisted firms with 
available financial data from 2003 to 2012 restricted to LMFs industries (LWFs) 
Sic code Industry description AIDA population LMFs 
  Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
01 Agricultural production-crops 644 0.82% 4 1.79% 
14 Mining and quarrying of nonmetallic minerals, 
except fuels 
463 0.59% 9 4.02% 
15 Building construction-general contractors and 
operative builders 
5,486 7.00% 41 18.30% 
16 Heavy construction other than building 
construction-contractors 
524 0.67% 3 1.34% 
17 Construction-special trade contractors 4,032 5.15% 8 3.57% 
20 Food and kindred products 3,224 4.12% 6 2.68% 
25 Furniture and fixtures manufacturing 829 1.06% 3 1.34% 
28 Chemicals and allied products manufacturing 1,598 2.04% 1 0.45% 
29 Petroleum refining and related industries 158 0.20% 2 0.89% 
32 Stone, clay, glass and concrete products 
manufacturing 
1,960 2.50% 13 5.80% 
34 Fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and transportation equipment 
7,038 8.98% 2 0.89% 
42 Motor freight transportation and warehousing 2,894 3.69% 18 8.04% 
44 Water transportation 586 0.75% 1 0.45% 
45 Transportation by air 95 0.12% 1 0.45% 
47 Transportation services 1,884 2.40% 3 1.34% 
49 Electric, gas and sanitary services 1,419 1.81% 7 3.13% 
50 Wholesale trade, durable goods 14,064 17.95% 23 10.27% 
51 Wholesale trade, nondurable goods wholesale 
dealing in 
7,821 9.98% 19 8.48% 
52 Building materials, hardware, garden supply, 
and mobile home dealers wholesale dealing in 
1,018 1.30% 1 0.45% 
53 General merchandise stores 324 0.41% 1 0.45% 
54 Food stores 1,737 2.22% 16 7.14% 
55 Automotive dealers and gasoline service 
stations 
536 0.68% 4 1.79% 
56 Apparel and accessory stores 1,920 2.45% 3 1.34% 
57 Home furniture, furnishings, and equipment 
stores 
872 1.11% 1 0.45% 
58 Eating and drinking places 1,007 1.29% 2 0.89% 
59 Miscellaneous retail 1,475 1.88% 1 0.45% 
65 Real estate 2,239 2.86% 7 3.13% 
70 Hotels, rooming houses, camps, and other 
lodging places 
1,600 2.04% 3 1.34% 
72 Personal services 327 0.42% 1 0.45% 
73 Business services 5,001 6.38% 2 0.89% 
75 Automotive repair, services, and parking 882 1.13% 1 0.45% 
79 Amusement and recreation services 744 0.95% 5 2.23% 
80 Health services 1,165 1.49% 9 4.02% 
81 Legal services 19 0.02% 1 0.45% 
87 Engineering, accounting, research, 
management, and related services 
2,755 3.52% 2 0.89% 
Total 78,340 100.00% 224 100.00% 
 
Source: AIDA database, 2013. 
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Table 3: LMFs by Italian region and Mafia organization 
Italian Region Number of LMFs Percentage of LMFs Mafia organization 
with major presence in 
the region* 
Sicily  114 50.89% Cosa Nostra 
Calabria 61 27.23% Ndrangheta 
Campania 20 8.93% Camorra 
Lazio 13 5.80% Camorra 
Apulia 6 2.68% Sacra Corona Unita 
Lombardy  4 1.79% Ndrangheta 
Abruzzo 3 1.34% Camorra 
Piedmont  2 0.89% Ndrangheta 
Emilia-Romagna 1 0.45% Ndrangheta 
Total  224 100.00%   
 
*Source: Transcrime (2013) 
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Table 4: LMFs by confiscation year 
Confiscation year Number of confiscated LMFs Percentage 
1994 3 1.33% 
1995 1 0.44% 
1996 1 0.44% 
1997 1 0.44% 
1998 2 0.89% 
1999 1 0.44% 
2000 2 0.89% 
2001 3 1.33% 
2002 2 0.89% 
2004 10 4.45% 
2005 1 0.45% 
2006 9 4.01% 
2007 18 8.03% 
2008 24 10.71% 
2009 19 8.48% 
2010 24 10.72% 
2011 35 15.64% 
2012 37 16.54% 
2013 31 13.87% 
Total 224 100.00% 
 
Source: ANBSC and AIDA database, 2013. 
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Table 5: Estimation of normal contribution expenses based on net sales (Eq. (1))  
SIC 
code 
1/TAt-1  St/TAt-1 ∆St /TAt-1 ∆St-1/TAt-1  Intercept Mean 
obs. 
Mean 
 R2 
F 
01 8.418 *** 0.005 *** 0.000  0.001  0.011 *** 607 0.148 85.98 *** 
14 25.943 *** 0.046 *** -0.020 *** -0.008 ** 0.001  433 0.411 6,633.16 *** 
15 19.421 *** 0.042 *** -0.020 *** -0.008 *** 0.000  5,126 0.514 515.56 *** 
16 26.731 *** 0.036 *** -0.018 *** -0.009 *** 0.013 *** 493 0.407 205.29 *** 
17 20.167 *** 0.031 *** -0.015 *** -0.006 *** 0.016 *** 3,831 0.309 857.85 *** 
20 17.820 *** 0.014 *** -0.008 ** -0.004  0.008 *** 3,044 0.252 698.80 *** 
25 18.197 *** 0.023 *** -0.013 *** -0.003  0.016 *** 792 0.266 264.00 *** 
28 13.535 *** 0.019 *** -0.006 ** -0.008 ** 0.013 *** 1,530 0.208 504.91 *** 
29 10.271 *** 0.002 * -0.002  -0.005  0.024 *** 146 0.110 62.23 *** 
32 19.707 *** 0.033 *** -0.019 *** -0.009 *** 0.007 *** 1,854 0.327 289.15 *** 
34 25.501 *** 0.033 *** -0.017 *** -0.011 *** 0.013 *** 6,764 0.320 1,725.95 *** 
42 20.410 *** 0.010 *** 0.006 * 0.005  0.037 *** 2,521 0.133 307.93 *** 
44 17.561 *** 0.055 *** -0.032 ** 0.012  0.039 *** 547 0.362 192.15 *** 
45 -10.381  0.029 *** -0.011  -0.027  0.043 *** 87 0.194 25.38 *** 
47 9.587 *** 0.004 *** 0.002 *** -0.001  0.036 *** 1,788 0.091 445.47 *** 
49 29.173 *** 0.011 *** -0.005  -0.007  0.023 *** 1,335 0.166 74.50 *** 
50 9.816 *** 0.003 *** 0.000  -0.003 *** 0.020 *** 13,326 0.070 78.37 *** 
51 6.568 *** 0.005 *** -0.002 * -0.002 ** 0.014 *** 7,380 0.101 454.47 *** 
52 0.585  0.016 *** -0.008 *** -0.007 *** 0.007 *** 958 0.219 454.13 *** 
53 5.399 *** 0.011 *** 0.004 ** 0.002  0.014 *** 304 0.250 219.45 *** 
54 3.473 *** 0.018 *** -0.001  -0.006 ** 0.008 *** 1,627 0.414 1,020.19 *** 
55 2.863 *** 0.008 *** -0.002  -0.003 *** 0.005 *** 493 0.292 909.01 *** 
56 -1.758 ** 0.026 *** -0.010 *** -0.012 *** 0.002 ** 1,493 0.458 967.60 *** 
57 -1.305 *** 0.015 *** -0.007 ** -0.005 ** 0.013 *** 825 0.239 500.01 *** 
58 13.618 *** 0.038 *** -0.011 ** -0.002  0.027 *** 951 0.540 2,183.82 *** 
59 2.721 *** 0.013 *** -0.003  -0.004 ** 0.019 *** 1,389 0.175 489.44 *** 
65 1.483 *** 0.027 *** -0.011 *** -0.003 * 0.001 *** 2,100 0.358 308.92 *** 
70 7.743 *** 0.051 *** -0.023 *** -0.016 *** 0.007 *** 1,510 0.747 885.82 *** 
72 4.468 * 0.049 *** -0.012  0.007  0.021 *** 307 0.383 351.60 *** 
73 6.547 *** 0.032 *** -0.005 ** 0.006  0.043 *** 4,721 0.145 764.51 *** 
75 28.460 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 * 0.002  0.029 *** 835 0.236 103.60 *** 
79 21.286 *** 0.011 *** 0.004  0.000  0.034 *** 702 0.175 99.62 *** 
80 -11.218 *** 0.048 *** -0.016 ** -0.014 ** 0.020 *** 1,084 0.357 2,397.74 *** 
81 26.109 *** 0.030 *** 0.006  -0.003  0.009 * 18 0.654 174.87 *** 
87 15.451 *** 0.017 *** -0.003  0.000  0.039 *** 2,598 0.122 89.81 *** 
 
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, based on a two-tailed 
test. The coefficients and R2, reported by two-digit SIC code, are the mean values of coefficients and R2 
of cross-sectional estimations across 280 industry-years. 
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Table 6: Estimation of normal contribution expenses based on material consumption (Eq. (2))  
SIC  
code 
1/TAt-1 CONSUMt/  
TAt-1 
∆CONSUMt/ 
TAt-1 
∆CONSUMt-1/ 
TAt-1 
Intercept Mean 
obs. 
Mean 
 R2 
F 
01 14.932 *** -0.002 ** 0.002  0.001  0.014 *** 608 0.123 182.74 *** 
14 53.923 *** 0.011 *** 0.003  0.003  0.023 *** 433 0.232 330.67 *** 
15 45.565 *** 0.023 *** -0.012 *** -0.002  0.016 *** 5,124 0.327 350.79 *** 
16 44.324 *** 0.018 *** 0.007  -0.001  0.035 *** 493 0.264 88.11 *** 
17 38.200 *** -0.009 *** 0.021 *** 0.005 * 0.047 *** 3,831 0.214 155.48 *** 
20 26.727 *** 0.001 * 0.001  0.001  0.021 *** 3,043 0.165 86.21 *** 
25 29.625 *** 0.000  0.006  0.002  0.039 *** 792 0.178 137.19 *** 
28 20.501 *** -0.001  0.011 *** -0.003  0.033 *** 1,530 0.100 219.33 *** 
29 11.299 *** -0.002 ** 0.002  -0.002  0.027 *** 146 0.103 19.76 *** 
32 39.203 *** -0.007 *** 0.011 ** 0.001  0.035 *** 1,854 0.196 147.16 *** 
34 40.858 *** -0.017 *** 0.026 *** 0.004  0.051 *** 6,764 0.233 229.02 *** 
42 27.222 *** -0.005 *** 0.030 *** 0.019 *** 0.050 *** 2,521 0.108 465.43 *** 
44 63.382 *** -0.042 *** 0.020  0.043 ** 0.101 *** 547 0.191 146.65 *** 
45 8.922  -0.002  0.032  -0.002  0.068 *** 87 0.063 2.06  
47 13.334 *** -0.003 *** 0.006 * 0.002  0.043 *** 1,787 0.080 306.63 *** 
49 36.262 *** -0.009 *** 0.013 *** 0.004 * 0.036 *** 1,334 0.145 423.82 *** 
50 11.609 *** -0.002 *** 0.003 *** -0.002 ** 0.027 *** 13,325 0.067 147.22 *** 
51 9.717 *** 0.000 *** 0.000  -0.003 * 0.021 *** 7,379 0.075 347.29 *** 
52 5.749 *** 0.008 *** -0.004 * -0.006 *** 0.018 *** 957 0.086 74.21 *** 
53 8.534 *** 0.007 *** 0.008 ** 0.003  0.022 *** 304 0.151 356.49 *** 
54 6.703 *** 0.018 *** -0.001  -0.006 * 0.016 *** 1,628 0.325 373.81 *** 
55 5.053 *** 0.007 *** -0.001  -0.003 *** 0.008 *** 493 0.241 330.06 *** 
56 3.781 ** 0.024 *** -0.010 *** -0.012 *** 0.013 *** 1,493 0.258 246.01 *** 
57 2.561 *** 0.011 *** -0.006 * -0.006 * 0.022 *** 825 0.104 68.02 *** 
58 37.917 *** 0.012 *** 0.007  0.008  0.062 *** 951 0.326 700.32 *** 
59 10.826 *** 0.002 ** 0.003  -0.003  0.032 *** 1,388 0.074 81.81 *** 
65 23.431 *** 0.012 *** -0.009 ** 0.002  0.007 *** 2,099 0.175 142.26 *** 
70 51.250 *** 0.047 *** -0.017  -0.006  0.020 *** 1,510 0.541 216.69 *** 
72 39.838 *** -0.019 *** 0.027 ** 0.009  0.068 *** 307 0.208 74.26 *** 
73 26.983 *** -0.029 *** 0.032 *** 0.015 *** 0.082 *** 4,719 0.076 1,877.84 *** 
75 30.539 *** -0.005 *** 0.007 *** 0.002  0.038 *** 835 0.243 152.77 *** 
79 32.457 *** -0.010 ** 0.028 *** 0.022 ** 0.042 *** 702 0.153 412.59 *** 
80 22.959 *** 0.026 *** 0.020  0.001  0.050 *** 1,085 0.139 120.60 *** 
81 25.773 *** 1.841 *** -0.632  -0.012  0.045 *** 18 0.487 92.84 *** 
87 28.266 *** -0.022 *** 0.024 *** 0.005  0.057 *** 2,596 0.107 339.34 *** 
 
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, based on a two-tailed 
test. The coefficients and R2, reported by two-digit SIC code, are the mean values of coefficients and R2 
of cross-sectional estimations across 280 industry-years. 
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Table 7: Time series of LTAV measures in LMFs around confiscation year = 
0 
 ABSOC1  ABSOC2 
Year Median Test ∆%Median Median Test ∆%Median 
-5 -0,0135 **  -0,0189 ***  
-4 -0,0117 *** 13,21% -0,0177 *** 6,31% 
-3 -0,0113 *** 3,90% -0,0154 *** 12,56% 
-2 -0,0109 *** 3,04% -0,0166 *** -7,19% 
-1 -0,0128 *** -17,15% -0,0161 *** 2,89% 
0 -0,0094 *** 26,35% -0,0132 *** 17,78% 
1 -0,0050 *** 46,97% -0,0107 *** 19,35% 
2 -0,0051  -1,55% -0,0105 *** 1,14% 
 
Notes: ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, based on a two-tailed 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the difference of median from zero. ∆%Median represents the percentage 
change of median relative to previous period. 
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics and variable comparison between LMFs and LWFs  
 LMFs before 
confisc. 
LMFs after 
confisc. 
LWFs  LMFs before 
confisc. - LWFs 
LMFs after 
confisc. - LWFs 
Variable N Median N Median N Median Difference Test Difference Test 
ABSOC1  616 -0.0117 490 -0.0052 659,094 -0.0047 -0.0070 *** -0.0005  
P_ABSOC1 172 0.0196 182 0.0130 267,636 0.0182 0.0014  -0.0052 ** 
N_ABSOC1 444 -0.0180 308 -0.0141 391,458 -0.0155 -0.0025 *** 0.0015 ** 
ABSOC2 616 -0.0161 490 -0.0105 659,016 -0.0067 -0.0094 *** -0.0038 *** 
P_ABSOC2 153 0.0205 160 0.0165 259,845 0.0206 -0.0002  -0.0041  
N_ABSOC2 463 -0.0231 330 -0.0178 399,171 -0.0176 -0.0055 *** -0.0003  
SIZE 967 7.9444 553 8.2300 753,484 7.8023 0.1421  0.4277 *** 
LEVLONG  967 0.0238 553 0.0643 753,480 0.0296 -0.0058  0.0347 *** 
CAPINT 967 0.1621 553 0.1874 753,400 0.1514 0.0107  0.0360 * 
INVTA 967 0.0540 553 0.0885 753,457 0.1157 -0.0617 *** -0.0272  
ROA 967 0.0220 553 0.0113 753,371 0.0276 -0.0055 *** -0.0163 *** 
GROWTH 750 0.1089 517 0.0043 671,352 0.0371 0.0718 *** -0.0328 *** 
CH_REC  698 0.0261 490 0.0048 599,106 0.0028 0.0233 *** 0.0019  
CH_INV  750 0.0002 517 0.0000 671,298 0.0000 0.0002 *** 0.0000  
ABMAT 622 0.0599 490 0.0529 661,717 -0.0037 0.0636 *** 0.0567 *** 
LNGDP 1436 9.7159 804 9.7307 777,380 10.2886 -0.5728 *** -0.5580 *** 
ETR 966 0.4229 553 0.3340 751,630 0.5153 -0.0924 *** -0.1813 *** 
%LOSS 3.90%  15.05%  6.34%  -2.44% *** 8.71% *** 
 
Notes: The sample full period spans 2003–2012. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively, based on a two-tailed Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test for the differences in medians 
of continuous variables. Pearson chi-squared test of independence for categorical variable %LOSS = 
% of firms with two or more consecutive years of negative income. See Appendix for variable definition. 
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Table 9: Heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors linear regression of LTAV measures  
  ABSOC1 P_ABSOC1 N_ABSOC1 ABSOC2 P_ABSOC2 N_ABSOC2 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
CRIME1 (Hypothesis H1) – -0.0045 0.0040 0.0009 0.7440 -0.0043 0.0000 -0.0081 0.0000 -0.0024 0.4060 -0.0074 0.0000 
CRIME2 (Hypothesis H2) ? 0.0010 0.5490 0.0070 0.0030 -0.0017 0.0850 0.0011 0.5790 0.0079 0.0110 -0.0036 0.0000 
SIZE ? -0.0012 0.0000 -0.0054 0.0000 0.0036 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0000 -0.0050 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000 
LEVLONG  – -0.0138 0.0000 -0.0150 0.0000 0.0027 0.0000 -0.0264 0.0000 -0.0201 0.0000 -0.0046 0.0000 
CAPINT + 0.0076 0.0000 -0.0131 0.0000 0.0154 0.0000 -0.0077 0.0000 -0.0151 0.0000 0.0043 0.0000 
INVTA – 0.0018 0.0000 -0.0139 0.0000 0.0123 0.0000 -0.0067 0.0000 -0.0141 0.0000 0.0050 0.0000 
ROA – -0.0236 0.0000 -0.0247 0.0000 -0.0046 0.0000 -0.0082 0.0000 -0.0172 0.0000 0.0013 0.0070 
GROWTH + 0.0010 0.0000 0.0142 0.0000 -0.0100 0.0000 0.0087 0.0000 0.0180 0.0000 -0.0067 0.0000 
CH_REC  + 0.0028 0.0000 0.0029 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0550 0.0043 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 
CH_INV  + 0.0439 0.0000 0.0382 0.0000 0.0112 0.0000 0.0309 0.0000 0.0358 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 
ABMAT – -0.0494 0.0000 -0.0498 0.0000 -0.0105 0.0000 -0.0457 0.0000 -0.0453 0.0000 -0.0051 0.0000 
LNGDP + -0.0007 0.0010 -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0017 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0730 0.0011 0.0000 
LOSS ? 0.0047 0.0000 0.0036 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000 0.0045 0.0000 -0.0008 0.0000 
ETR + 0.0012 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 
INDSEC dummies ? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
YEAR dummies ? Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Intercept ? 0.0146 0.0000 0.0907 0.0000 -0.0411 0.0000 -0.0361 0.0000 0.0880 0.0000 -0.0693 0.0000 
Number of observations 
 588,601  238,731  349,870  588,547  232,429  356,118  
R-squared 
 0.1397  0.3601  0.3880  0.1283  0.3388  0.3882  
Wald chi2 
 53,736 0.0000 74,381 0.0000 133,577 0.0000 50,992 0.0000 70,125 0.0000 137,146 0.0000 
 
Notes: The p-values are two-tailed. See Appendix for variable definition. 
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Table 10: Two dimensional cluster corrected standard errors regression of 
unadjusted social contribution expenses 
Variable Exp. Sign Coef. p-value 
CRIME1 (Hypothesis H1) – -0.0061 0.0340 
CRIME2 (Hypothesis H2) ? -0.0004 0.9050 
1/TAt-1  ? 13.9642 0.0000 
St/TAt-1 + 0.0111 0.0000 
∆St /TAt-1 ? -0.0029 0.0130 
∆St-1/TAt-1  ? -0.0011 0.2880 
LEVLONG  – -0.0239 0.0000 
CAPINT + -0.0023 0.0840 
INVTA – -0.0085 0.0000 
ROA – -0.0149 0.0100 
GROWTH + 0.0042 0.0000 
CH_REC  + 0.0025 0.0000 
CH_INV  + 0.0389 0.0000 
ABMAT – -0.0516 0.0000 
LNGDP + 0.0023 0.0010 
LOSS ? 0.0043 0.0000 
ETR + 0.0015 0.0000 
INDSEC dummies ? Yes  
YEAR dummies ? Yes  
Intercept ? 0.0082 0.2400 
Number of observations  535,820  
R-squared  0.4131  
Wald chi2  13,925 0.0000 
 
Notes: The p-values are two-tailed. See Appendix for variable definition. 
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Table 11: Heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors linear regression of LTAV 
measures within a matched sample 
 
 ABSOC1 ABSOC2 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
CRIME1 (Hypothesis H1) 
(base LAW1) 
– -0.0054 0.0070 -0.0074 0.0010 
CRIME2 (Hypothesis H2) 
(base LAW2) 
? 0.0013 0.5390 0.0021 0.3800 
SIZE ? -0.0015 0.0050 -0.0017 0.0020 
LEVLONG  – -0.0091 0.0020 -0.0184 0.0000 
CAPINT + 0.0044 0.1160 -0.0080 0.0070 
INVTA – 0.0007 0.8090 -0.0128 0.0000 
ROA – -0.0412 0.0000 -0.0176 0.1030 
GROWTH + 0.0009 0.7840 0.0051 0.1280 
CH_REC  + 0.0068 0.0990 0.0090 0.0410 
CH_INV  + 0.0394 0.0000 0.0269 0.0010 
ABMAT – -0.0388 0.0000 -0.0387 0.0000 
LNGDP + 0.0002 0.9260 0.0072 0.0090 
LOSS ? 0.0019 0.2740 0.0014 0.4740 
ETR + 0.0004 0.4990 0.0009 0.0970 
INDSEC dummies ? Yes  Yes  
YEAR dummies ? Yes  Yes  
Intercept 
(base LAW1) 
? 0.0086 0.7520 -0.0539 0.0660 
Intercept 
(base LAW2) 
? 0.0101 0.7130 -0.0522 0.0770 
Number of observations  4,044  4,044  
R-squared  0.1382  0.1448  
Wald chi2  364.61 0.0000 416.92 0.0000 
 
Notes: The p-values are two-tailed. LAW1: dummy variable taking value of 1 for LWFs observations 
matched to LMFs pre-confiscation firm-years and 0 otherwise; LAW2: dummy variable taking value of 1 
for LWFs observations matched to LMFs post-confiscation firm-years and 0 otherwise.  See Appendix for 
the other variable definition. 
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Fig.1 Time series of LTAV measures in LMFs around confiscation year = 0 
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